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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is the Court of Appeals' construction of the parties' 
stock purchase option contract in conflict with this Court's 
ruling in Davies v. Semloh Hotel, 86 Utah 318, 44 P.2d 689 (1935), 
and Taylor v. Paynes, 118 Utah 72, 218 P.2d 1069 (1950)? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in construing the nature 
of the contract the parties intended to create? 
3. After notice of R.O.A.'s exercise of the purchase 
option on January 27, 1987, did plaintiff Webb retain his right of 
inspection under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(d)? 
4. Did the Court of Appeals err in awarding plaintiff 
Webb multiple statutory penalties under Utah Code Ann. 
§16-10-47(c)? 
COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is published at 
Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 106 Utah Adv.Rep. 47 (Utah Ct.App. 
1989). See Addendum, A-2 to A-7.) 
JURISDICTION 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on April 
11, 1989. A 30-day extension of time within which to petition for 
certiorari was granted and entered by this Court on May 1, 1989. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1988) Confers jurisdiction on 
this Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision by a writ of 
certiorari. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY 
OR OTHER AUTHORITIES 
The text of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-2(15) and §16-10-47(b) 
and (c) are set forth in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an issue of first impression in Utah 
concerning the relationship between a corporation and its 
stockholders. This appeal arises from an action by plaintiff to 
compel defendants R.O.A. and Reagan to produce the corporate books 
and records of R.O.A. pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) 
(1953). Plaintiff also seeks to recover statutory penalties under 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1953) for defendants1 alleged multi-
ple wrongful refusals to allow such examinations. 
Plaintiff and his wife, Bessie Webb, formerly owned stock 
in R.O.A. as joint tenants. (R. at 2, 80, 84, 89, 90, 130, 517) 
On July 7, 1981, plaintiff and Bessie Webb (hereinafter the 
"Webbs"), and William Reagan (hereinafter "Reagan"), executed a 
written agreement (hereinafter the "Agreement"), forming R.O.A., a 
Utah corporation. (R. at 62-78) Pursuant to the Agreement, Reagan 
obtained 80% of the stock of R.O.A. and the Webbs acquired the 
balance of the stock. (R. at 34, 203, 274) 
Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Agreement, R.O.A. had the 
right to purchase all of the Webbs' stock. (R. at 71-72) In order 
to exercise such right, R.O.A. was only required to provide notice 
of the purchase within 6 months after August 1, 1986. (R. at 71-72) 
Pursuant to the Agreement, the purchase price of the Webbs' stock 
was to be determined by an independent appraisal. (R. at 62-78) 
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The terms of payment for the Webbs1 stock were also determined in 
the Agreement, (R. at 71-74) Following notice of R.O.A.fs elec-
tion to purchase their stock, the Webbs were contractually 
required to begin the appraisal process. (R. at 72) 
Plaintiff served as a director of R.O.A. beginning on 
August 1, 1981. (R. at 35, 80) During the period of his 
employment as a director of R.O.A. and for so long as the Webbs 
were stockholders, plaintiff maintained an office at R.O.A.!s 
corporate headquarters and had access to the books and records of 
R.O.A. Plaintiff, in fact, periodically reviewed R.O.A.'s books 
and records. (R. at 158, 178-81, 287) 
On or about March 5, 1985, plaintiff, by and through his 
accountant, Duane E. Karren, made demand upon R.O.A. to formally 
inspect its corporate books and records. (R. at 190-94) Pursuant 
to the Webbs' request, R.O.A. made its books and records available 
for inspection. Mr. Karren subsequently inspected R.O.A.fs books 
and records. (R. at 191) 
By letter dated January 27, 1987, R.O.A. gave notice to 
plaintiff of its exercise of its purchase option. (R. at 43, 78A, 
207, 280, 484, 508) 
On April 20, 1987, plaintiff informed R.O.A. and Reagan 
that he intended to exercise his statutory right to inspect the 
books and records of R.O.A. (R. at 53, 485) The demand did not 
state the purpose of the proposed examination. (R. at 53) 
Plaintiff's April 20 demand was received at R.O.A. 
headquarters while Reagan was out of the country. R.O.A. informed 
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plaintiff that Reagan would be out of the country until May 18, 
1987. R.O.A. requested that plaintiff renew his demand once Reagan 
returned. (R. at 54, 485) R.O.A. also informed plaintiff that 
recent personnel changes in R.O.A.'s accounting department would 
make such an inspection extremely difficult for R.O.A. to respond 
to immediately. R.O.A. also indicated that plaintiff would need to 
clarify his demand in order to facilitate production of the desired 
records. (R. at 54) 
Plaintiff's accountant, Mr. Karren, on or about May 18, 
1987, identified the records he sought to inspect. The May 18 
letter indicated that the desired examination was to be substan-
tially similar to Mr. Karren's prior examination of R.O.A.'s 
records. (R. at 55-56) The letter did not set a date for exami-
nation of the records. 
Much of the information requested in the May 18 letter 
required R.O.A. to expend considerable time and effort to comply 
with the request. Plaintiff's May 18 request required defendant to 
do far more than simply open its books for inspection. Plaintiff 
specifically demanded that R.O.A. assemble various summaries and 
explanations of certain business transactions. (R. at 55-56) 
On May 20, 1987, plaintiff made demand upon R.O.A. through 
a new agent, Attorney Victoria E. Brieant. The May 20 demand 
stated that Attorney Brieant and others would be present at 10:00 
a.m. on May 27, 1987, at the offices of R.O.A. to examine the 
corporate records. (R. at 57, 93) Plaintiff made no effort to 
arrange a mutually convenient time to conduct the investigation. 
P7 -A _ 
Attorney Brieant!s May 20 demand also indicated that she 
intended to use "our accountants, Peat, Marwick & Mitchell • . . ." 
Ms. Brieantfs demand also alluded to the need for an appraisal. 
The demand did not specify, however, whether the requested 
examination would be used in the appraisal of the Webbs' stock as 
required under the Agreement. (R. at 57) 
Defendants R.O.A. and Reagan responded to plaintiff's 
demand by requesting that R.O.A. be given sufficient time to pre-
pare for the examination, that the examination be conducted in 
accordance with the Agreement's appraisal process, that the 
confidentiality of R.O.A.'s trade secrets and financial informa-
tion be maintained, and lastly, that the inspection be done in an 
orderly fashion so as to minimize disruption of R.O.A.'s ongoing 
business. (R. at 58, 94) 
In May, 1987, Richard Brooks, a key employee in R.O.A.'s 
accounting department, terminated his employment. Mr. Brooks' 
absence left R.O.A. shorthanded, thereby making it extremely 
difficult for R.O.A. to promptly prepare the requested summaries 
and reports. (R. at 54, 178-81, 287) 
On May 26, 1987, a letter was hand-delivered to 
plaintiff's counsel from defendants' counsel, William H. Adams. 
Mr. Adams explained that R.O.A.'s records would be made available 
for examination by plaintiff or his agents in accordance with the 
appraisal rights accorded plaintiff under the Agreement. Adams 
indicated that it would be unreasonable to expect R.O.A. to assume 
the burden of multiple examinations by parties other than plaintiff's 
designated appraiser. (R. at 58) 
Despite prior indications by plaintiff's counsel that a 
Mr. Donald Sutte had been appointed to render an appraisal of the 
value of the Webbs' stock, plaintiff's counsel and various other 
individuals from Peat, Marwick & Mitchell arrived at R.O.A. 
headquarters on the morning of May 27, 1987. (R. at 37, 38, 57, 
93, 94, 102) While plaintiff's counsel was at R.O.A. corporate 
headquarters, defendants' counsel notifed her that an inspection 
of R.O.A.'s records would not be permitted on that date. (R. at 
37, 38, 93, 94, 102) 
On May 29, 1987, plaintiff filed suit against defendants, 
seeking damages from R.O.A. for alleged breach of an employment 
contract. In addition, plaintiff sought injunctive relief and 
statutory damages against R.O.A., Reagan and others for their 
alleged wrongful refusal to permit plaintiff to inspect the 
corporate records of R.O.A. (R. at 2-9) 
On June 3, 1987, plaintiff once again made demand to 
inspect the books and records of R.O.A. (R. at 59-60) Plaintiff's 
counsel indicated that the inspection would take place beginning at 
10:00 a.m. on June 5, 19 87. 
By letter dated June 4, 1987, defendants' counsel advised 
plaintiff's counsel that R.O.A. would make its employees available 
to assist plaintiff's inspection beginning June 15, 1987. (R. at 
61) Counsel was also informed that the inspection would take place 
only upon the condition that the individuals examining the records 
would be required to sign a confidentiality agreement prior to 
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beginning their inspection. (R. at 61) 
On June 15, 1987, when plaintiff's attorney and several 
unidentified persons appeared at the office of R.O.A., Ms. Brieant 
refused to permit any of the parties to execute the confidentiality 
agreement. Ms. Brieant also refused to comply with the other 
conditions R.O.A. had placed upon plaintiff's inspection of the 
records as set forth in R.O.A.'s prior correspondence to plaintiff. 
(R. at 288) As a result, R.O.A. and Reagan declined to permit 
Ms. Brieant and the others access to R.O.A.'s records. (R. at 96) 
On June 15, 1987, plaintiff filed his first Amended 
Complaint, seeking additional statutory damages due to the refusal 
of R.O.A. and Reagan "on three separate occasions" to permit 
inspection of R.O.A.'s records. (R. at 33-47) 
One week after filing the Amended Complaint, plaintiff 
moved for partial summary judgment. (R. at 111-12) Plaintiff's 
motion was supported by various affidavits. (R. at 89-97) On 
June 26, 1987, defendants R.O.A. and Reagan filed cross-motions for 
partial summary judgment. (R. at 128-29, 185-86) Defendants' 
cross-motions for partial summary judgment were also supported by 
various affidavits. (R. at 156-58, 178-81) 
On August 28, 1987, the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, The Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, denied 
plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and granted 
defendant's cross-motions for summary judgment. (R. at 344-45) 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, and 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS A SHAREHOLDER UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN. §16-10-47 (1953). 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) (1953) codifies the common law 
rule that a shareholder has the right to inspect corporate books 
and records at a reasonable time and for a reasonable purpose. A 
"shareholder" is further defined under Utah law as "one who is a 
holder of record of shares in a corporation." Utah Code Ann. 
§16-10-2(15) (1953) . 
R.O.A.'s purchase option constituted a continuing 
irrevocable offer of sale by the Webbs which could not be withdrawn 
during the stated period. The purchase option vested in R.O.A. a 
power of acceptance. The Agreement contemplated that once R.O.A. 
accepted the Webbs' offer, a binding bilateral contract of sale 
would be created. 1A Corbin On Contracts §§259, 260, 264 (1963 
ed.); 1 Williston On Contracts §§25, 61A-D (3d ed.); 17 Am.Jur.2d 
Contracts §32 (1964); and 77 C.J.S. Sales §33(d) (1952). See also, 
Ollie v. Rainbolt, 669 P.2d 275, 279 (Okla. 1983) (noting the crit-
ical difference between a right of first refusal agreement and a 
purchase option agreement). 
By exercising its purchase option on January 27, 1987, 
R.O.A. accepted the plaintiff's offer of sale, and bound the par-
ties to perform. 1 Williston On Contracts §61B (3d ed.). R.O.A.'s 
exercise of its purchase option obligated plaintiff Webb to comply 
with the Agreement by obtaining an appraisal and tendering his stock 
to R.O.A. See, Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life 
Ins. Co., 148 Colo. 519, 367 P.2d 335 (1961). In accordance with 
the terms of the Agreement, R.O.A.'s exercise of the purchase 
option divested plaintiff of his status as a shareholder on January 
27, 1987. As a result, plaintiff had no statutory right to inspect 
R.O.A.fs books and records any time thereafter. 
A similar result was reached in In Re Gaines, 180 N.Y.S. 
191 (1919), aff!d, 190 App.Div. 941, 179 N.Y.S. 922 (1920). In 
Gaines, plaintiff brought suit to examine certain corporate records. 
Plaintiff instituted the action claiming that her deceased father 
was a shareholder in the corporation, and that under his will she 
was entitled to the stock. The defendant corporation denied that 
plaintiff was a shareholder on the ground that she had entered into 
a binding contract to sell her interest in the stock. 
The Gaines court, after noting that the plaintiff's con-
tract to sell the stock was binding, concluded that the plaintiff 
had no standing to inspect the corporate records. IcL at 192. 
Plaintiff has asserted on appeal that he must be deemed to 
be a "shareholder," since he has not been paid for his stock. The 
Agreement does not provide that payment is a condition precedent to 
the formation of a binding bilateral contract of sale. In fact, if 
the appraiser determines the stock to be valueless, there would be 
no need for payment. The issue of payment is irrelevant. The sole 
question that must be determined is whether the contract of sale 
was in full force and effect at the time the option was exercised. 
The passing of title is not predicated upon payment of the purchase 
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price. 12A Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 
§5628 (rev. perm, ed. 1972). See also, Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy 
Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241, 245 (1967); Currey v. 
Willard Steam Service, 321 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1958). 
Plaintiff likewise contends that title to his shares does 
not pass until actual delivery of his stock certificate. It is 
well established that actual delivery of the certificate is not 
essential to the passing of title. Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco 
Polo, 17 Utah 2d 181, 407 P.2d 565 (1965)- See also, 12A Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §5626 (rev. perm, ed. 
197 2); 11 Fletcher Cyclopedia on the Law of Private Corporations 
§5094 (rev. perm. ed. 1986) (emphasis added). 
This Court in Davies v. Semloh Hotel, 86 Utah 318, 44 P.2d 
689 (1935), held that title to stock purchased under a binding con-
tract of sale vests at the time the contract is entered into. In 
Davies, the defendant offered plaintiff cash and certain shares of 
stock in return for plaintiff's agreement to work for the 
defendant. The employment contract also obligated plaintiff to 
purchase capital stock in the defendant corporation. In addition, 
the contract provided that if plaintiff was ever fired, the hotel 
would repurchase the stock. Upon his termination, plaintiff 
demanded payment for his stock. Defendant refused. The jury found 
in favor of plaintiff. 
On appeal, defendant contended that it was not obligated 
to purchase the stock from plaintiff. This Court rejected the 
defendant's argument, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, 
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by stating: 
This transaction did not contemplate an option 
on the part of the defendant to repurchase the 
stock, nor did it constitute what might be 
termed an offer to purchase the stock. It was 
a binding contract upon both parties subject 
only to a condition subsequent, viz., the 
discharge of the plaintiff from the employment 
contemplated in the contract. The condition 
subsequent having been fulfilled in the 
discharge of the plaintiff and the plaintiff 
having made tender of the stock, there would 
seem to be no good reason why he should not 
recover. It was the clear intention of the 
parties that the title of the stock should 
pass to the defendant upon the happening of 
the events as outlined upon which defendant 
became bound to pay. 
Davies, 44 P.2d at 690-91. (Emphasis added.) 
This Court in Taylor v. Paynes, 118 Utah 72, 218 P.2d 1069 
(1950), clearly holds that title to stock transfers upon the execu-
tion of a binding contract of sale, even though delivery and 
endorsement of the shares has not yet taken place. Taylor arose 
out of a dispute between Marvin S. Taylor and J. Fred Daynes, both 
shareholders in the Daynes Optical Company. Soon after the company 
was formed, Taylor expressed a desire to sell his stock. On July 
20, 1947, the corporate directors met to discuss the purchase of 
Taylorfs stock. On Monday, July 21, 1947, Taylor took his stock 
certificate to defendant's office. Defendant accepted the stock 
certificate and kept the stock certificate for several months. 
When plaintiff failed to receive any money for the stock, he took 
back the stock certificate in February, 1948. Plaintiff later 
endorsed and returned the stock certificate to defendant. 
Plaintiff then filed suit against defendant, alleging that 
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defendant had purchased the stock. The trial court found that the 
defendant had purchased the stock certificate on July 21, 1947, and 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
On appeal, the defendant contended that there could not 
have been a sale on July 21, 1947, since existing Utah law 
prohibited the consummation of a stock sale prior to the time the 
stock certificate was endorsed. This Court squarely rejected the 
defendant's argument, and held that title had vested in the 
defendant, thereby obligating him to pay for the stock: 
This being an action to recover the contract 
price of $6,000 and the trial court having 
found that the contract was one of immediate 
purchase, the time of indorsement is not 
material to appellant's liability so long as 
the indorsement is made upon tender of the 
purchase price. If, on July 21, 1947, the 
appellant obligated himself to pay for the 
purchase price of this stock, then the mere 
fact that transfer was not made would not 
defeat respondent's right to recover. 
* * * 
The appellant acquired an interest in 
the stock certificate on July 21, 1947, and 
should not escape paying therefor. 
Taylor, 218 P.2d at 1073-74 (emphasis added). 
Cases from other jurisdictions, dealing with the issue of 
whether a stockholder retains a right of inspection after entering 
into a binding contract of sale, provide persuasive evidence that 
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiff still has a 
right of inspection. Nash v. Gay Apparel Corp., 11 Misc.2d 768, 
175 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (1958); Dierking v. Associated Books Service, 
Inc., 31 Misc.2d 995, 222 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (1960); Rosenberg v. 
un 1 O 
Steinberg-Kass, Inc., 18 Misc.2d 880, 190 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1959). 
POINT II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONTRACT AWAY 
HIS STATUTORY RIGHT OF INSPECTION. 
Upon R.O.A.'s election to purchase plaintiff's outstanding 
shares, plaintiff is obligated to conduct an independent appraisal 
to determine the value of the stock. This appraisal right serves 
the same purpose as the statutory right of inspection. The 
Agreement reflects the parties1 intent that the contractual right 
of appraisal supersede and replace any statutory right of inspection. 
It is well established that, in the absence of an express statutory 
provision, parties may enter into contracts abrogating or limiting 
statutory provisions which confer a right or benefit upon one or 
both parties. Francam Building Corp. v. Fail, 646 P.2d 345 (Colo. 
1982), appeal after remand, 687 P.2d 991 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). 
Following R.O.A.'s purchase of plaintiff's stock, the 
parties intended that the stock's value be determined in accordance 
with the parties' Agreement. It would be totally inconsistent with 
the terms of the Agreement to find that the parties contemplated 
that plaintiff would be allowed not only his rights of appraisal, 
but also his statutory right of inspection. The only reasonable 
interpretation of the Agreement is that the parties intended the 
contractual right of appraisal to be the sole means by which 
plaintiff would be permitted to inspect the books of R.O.A. As a 
result, even if plaintiff retained his status as a shareholder, he 
had no statutory right of inspection. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF'S DEMANDS TO INSPECT WERE NOT 
DONE AT A REASONABLE TIME NOR FOR A 
PROPER PURPOSE. 
While the Court of Appeals characterizes defendants' 
actions as obtrusive and in violation of plaintiff's statutory 
right of inspection, the record clearly indicates that the 
defendants tried to assist the plaintiff in his attempt to review 
the books and records of R.O.A. Despite defendants' efforts, the 
plaintiff has refused to conduct the inspections in a reasonable 
manner. Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) (1953), does not grant a blan-
ket right of inspection to a stockholder. Utah law clearly 
requires that the demand for inspection be made at reasonable times 
and for a proper purpose. 
Defendants raised several affirmative defenses challenging 
the reasonableness and appropriateness of plaintiff's demand. 
First, defendants assert that several critical facts suggest that 
the plaintiff's demand to exercise his statutory right of inspec-
tion was motivated solely by an intent to harass the defendants. 
It is undisputed that plaintiff for several years had unbridled 
access to the books and records of R.O.A. Plaintiff was not merely 
a stockholder in R.O.A. He was, in fact, a director of the 
corporation. It is also undisputed that plaintiff had previously 
reviewed, both personally and by his accountant, the same books and 
records of R.O.A. he now seeks to inspect. The plaintiff's failure 
to demand a formal statutory inspection of the corporate records 
prior to R.O.A.'s election to purchase his stock suggests strongly 
that the plaintiff's demands were meant solely to vex and harass 
the defendants. Under such circumstances, courts have limited or 
denied a shareholder's statutory right of inspection. See Skouras 
v. Admiralty Enterprises, Inc., 386 A.2d 674 (Del. 1978); and Foss 
v. Peoples Gas Light and Coal Co., 241 111. 238, 89 N.E. 351 (1909). 
This Court in Clawson v. Clayton, 33 Utah 266, 93 P.2d 
729, 731 (Utah 1908), recognizes a corporation's right to refuse an 
inspection when the demand is unreasonable or for an improper 
purpose. Clawson also holds that a shareholder must demand inspec-
tion at reasonable times which would not unnecessarily impede or 
interfere with the ongoing operation of the corporation. See also, 
Holmes v. Bishop, 75 Utah 419, 285 P. 1011 (1930); Goddard v. 
General Reduction and Chemical Co., 57 Utah 180, 193 P. 1103 
(1920). In addition, a demand to inspect a corporation's books and 
records may be properly denied if the needed information is availa-
ble in other, less inconvenient, ways. See Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11, 
45 (1951). 
The parties' Agreement provides that a valuation appraisal 
will be conducted by independent parties. There is, therefore, no 
apparent reason for plaintiff to burden R.O.A. with multiple 
inspections, unless the inspections are directly related to the 
appraisal process. Defendants maintain that the only reason 
plaintiff is demanding to conduct a separate review of R.O.A.fs 
records pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) is to harass and 
vex defendants, and thereby obtain some advantage in arriving at a 
favorable sale price for his stock. At a minimum, the record is 
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inadequate to support the Court of Appeals1 ruling that plaintiff's 
inspection request was for a proper purpose as a matter of law. 
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff properly invoked his 
statutory right of inspection, plaintiff's demands have been 
unreasonable. Defendants submit that the records and books of 
R.O.A. contain various trade secrets and other information, which 
if leaked or revealed to competitors, could severely damage the 
economic viability of R.O.A.'s operations. (R. at 288) Due to the 
sensitive nature of corporate records, courts have permitted corpo-
rations to require non-disclosure assurances from shareholders. 
CM&M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 794 (Del. 1982). 
Defendants repeatedly requested that plaintiff and 
plaintiff's agents sign a confidentiality agreement prior to their 
inspection of the books and records of R.O.A. They refused. As a 
result of their refusal, plaintiff's demand should not be 
considered reasonable. 
Defendants' refusal to permit plaintiff to inspect the 
corporate records of R.O.A. was further supported by evidence that 
plaintiff on a prior occasion had taken unfair advantage of a 
corporate opportunity while serving as a director of another 
corporation. (R. at 158, 215-16) Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) 
provides that a corporation may refuse to open its books for 
inspection where the shareholder "has improperly used any 
information secured through any prior examination of the books and 
records of account, or minutes, or record of shareholders of such 
corporation or any other corporation . . . ." (Emphasis added.) 
The determination of whether a shareholder has acted 
reasonably in making demand upon a corporation to inspect its 
records is a matter more properly left to the trial court. The New 
Mexico Supreme Court in Schwartzman v. Schwartzman Packing Co., 99 
N.M. 436, 659 P.2d 888 (1983), held that a trial court has 
discretion to determine when and in what manner the right of 
examination by shareholders should be exercised. The Court of 
Appeals erred in holding as a matter of law that plaintiff's 
inspection requests were reasonable and proper. 
POINT IV. 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST THAT PRECLUDE 
THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF. 
Even if the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that 
plaintiff had a statutory right to inspect the books and records of 
R.O.A., numerous material issues of fact exist should have prevented 
the Court of Appeals from ordering the trial court to grant plain-
tiff's motion for partial summary judgment. Defendants respectfully 
submit that the determination of whether plaintiff requested such 
an inspection at a reasonable time and for a proper purpose, and 
whether defendants' refusal to permit such an inspection was 
wrongful are clearly questions of fact. See, Curkendall v. United 
Federation of Correction Officers, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 935, 483 
N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (1985); and DePaula v. Memory Gardens, Inc., 90 
A.D.2d 886, 456 N.Y.S.2d 522, 524 (1982). 
The record demonstrates that defendants believed that 
plaintiff's demand was unreasonable and improper. Defendants 
repeatedly attempted to assist plaintiff in his attempt to review 
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the books and records of R.O.A. Issues of fact remain as to 
whether plaintiff gave adequate notice to defendants before demand-
ing inspection of the R.O.A, books and records. Issues of fact 
remain as to whether the plaintiff's demands were reasonable due to 
their particular timing in relation to the accounting practices of 
R.O.A. and the availability of trained help to assist in the 
inspection. Issues of fact remain as to whether the scope of the 
requested inspection exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. The 
determination of these critical issues of material fact requires 
far more evidence and facts than appears in the record on appeal. 
Indeed, each of these material issues of fact should be resolved by 
a trier of fact, rather than by an appellate court. 
Even if plaintiff is found to have a statutory right of 
inspection, there are substantial issues of material fact as to 
whether plaintiff's demands were for a reasonable purpose. Issues 
of fact remain as to whether defendant's refusal was justified due 
to their interpretation of the parties' Agreement, whether 
defendants' actions were justified due to the plaintiff's refusal 
to guarantee the confidentiality of the R.O.A. records, and whether 
the defendants' refusal to permit the inspection of the R.O.A. 
books was justified due to the plaintiff's alleged prior usurpation 
of a corporate business opportunity. The propriety of plaintiff's 
demand should, therefore, be resolved by a trier of fact, rather 
than by an appellate court. 
In view of the numerous disputed issues of material fact, 
this Court should vacate the Court of Appeals' ruling that 
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defendants1 refusal was wrongful or unlawful. The determination of 
these issues should be made by the trier of fact. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO MULTIPLE STATUTORY 
PENALTIES FOR DEFENDANTS1 REFUSAL TO PERMIT 
ACCESS TO R.O.A.'S BOOKS AND RECORDS. 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1953) provides a statutory 
penalty for any officer, agent or corporation which refuses to 
allow a shareholder to examine its corporate books and records. 
The Court of Appeals broadly construed Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) 
to permit an award of multiple statutory penalties for what it 
characterized as three separate refusals by defendants. It is well 
established that such statutory penalty provisions are penal in 
nature, and are therefore subject to the rule of strict 
interpretation. Padovano v. Wotizky, 355 So.2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1978); and 18A Am.Jur.2d Corporations §421 (1985). Since the 
Utah statute is silent on the availability of multiple statutory 
penalty awards, this Court should rule as a matter of law that such 
multiple awards are forbidden. Assuming arguendo that multiple 
penalties are available under Utah law, the matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for a determination of how many, if 
any, refusals the defendant made. See Meyer v. Ford Industries, 
Inc., 272 Or. 531, 538 P.2d 353 (1975). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendants respectfully request 
that this Court vacate the Court of Appeals' decision and affirm 
the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of defen-
dants or, in the alternative, remand this action for resolution of 
any disputed issues of fact. 
DATED this ^ day of J^^^Ut _ , 1989. 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-2(15) (1953) 
(15) "Shareholder" means one who is a 
holder of record of shares in a corporation. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-47(b) and (c) (1953) 
(b) Any person who is a shareholder of 
record, upon written demand stating the purpose 
thereof, shall have the right to examine, in 
person, or by agent or attorney, at any reasonable 
time or times, for any proper purpose, its books 
and records of account, minutes and record of 
shareholders and to make extracts therefrom. A 
proper purpose means a propose reasonably related 
to the person's interest as a shareholder. 
(c) Any officer or agent who, or a corporation 
which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder, 
or his agent or attorney, so to examine and make 
extracts from its books and records of account, 
minutes, and record of shareholders, for any 
proper purpose, shall be liable to such share-
holder in a penalty of 10% of the value of the 
shares owned by such shareholder, in addition to 
any other damages or remedy afforded him by law; 
but no such penalty shall exceed $5,000. It shall 
be a defense to any action for penalties under 
this section that the person suing therefor has 
within two years sold or offered for sale any 
list of shareholders of such corporation or any 
other corporation or has aided or abetted any 
person in procuring any list of shareholders for 
any such purpose, or has improperly used any 
information secured through any prior examination 
of the books and records of account, or minutes, 
or record of shareholders of such corporation or 
any other corporation, or was not acting in good 
faith or for a proper purpose in making his demand. 
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3. On the contrary, the "strict construction" rule 
that is employed in connection with insurance poli-
cies accomplishes just the opposite result. Any 
ambiguity concerning the scope of insurance is 
construed in favor of coverage. See, e.g., Fuller v. 
Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah 
1985) ("An insured is entitled to the broadest prot-
ection he could have reasonably understood to be 
provided by the policy.*); Williams v. First Colony 
Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979) 
(ambiguity in insurance contract must be construed 
in favor of insured); Dienes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 
21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P.2d 468, 471 (1968) (no 
ambiguous statement may be enforced against an 
insured). See also Colard v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 709 P.2d 11, 14 (Colo. App. 1985) (if an 
insurance company intends to exclude from coverage 
damage resulting from the insured's own negligence, 
it must do so clearly and unambiguously); American 
Excess Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 729 
P.2d 1352, 1354 (Nev. 1986) (insurance contracts are 
construed to accomplish the object of providing 
indemnity to the insured); Weldon v. Commercial 
Union Assurance Co., 103 N.M. 522, 710 P.2d 89, 
91 (1985) ("When an ambiguity exists, the court 
must construe the policy so as to sustain indem-
nity."). 
4. Under different facts, the lack of explicit lang-
uage clearly indicating an intent to provide coverage 
for the insured's own negligence may leave open the 
question of whether such coverage was intended. 
However, such ambiguity would be resolved through 
the ordinary rules of contract interpretation rather 
than by invoking the strict construction rule. See 
generally Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 
582, 585-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
5. We do not suggest that the presence of other 
insurance is irrelevant in such cases. In an action for 
breach of a contract to provide insurance, the 
measure of general damages is typically the amount 
the policy would have paid had it been obtained. See, 
e.g., PPG Indust. v. Continental Heller Corp., 
124 Ariz. 216, 603 P.2d 108, 113-114 (1979). That 
amount could readily be affected by the existence of 
two or more policies (including policies of insurance 
which should have been obtained as contractually 
required) providing coverage for the same loss. See, 
e.g., Utah Code Ann. §31 A-21-307(2) (1986). 
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OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Roland Webb filed this action against 
R.O.A. General, Inc. ("R.O.A."), a Utah 
corporation, and William Reagan, its majority 
shareholder, and others, in part to enforce his 
claimed right to examine R.O.A.'s corporate 
books and records pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §16-10-47(0) (1987), a section of the 
Utah Business Corporation Act (the "Act"). 
He also sought the imposition of penalties 
under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1987) 
for respondents' refusals to permit such an 
examination. The trial court, on cross-
motions for partial summary judgment on 
these claims, ruled Webb had no inspection 
rights because he had ceased being a shareh-
older of record within the meaning of the 
statute. We reverse. 
Webb and Reagan formed R.O.A. by 
written agreement dated July 7, 1981. Reagan 
received eighty percent of the stock and Webb 
the remaining twenty percent. Reagan remains 
the controlling shareholder and corporate 
president. The incorporation agreement gives 
R.O.A. an option to purchase Webb's shares, 
but the option provisions do not fix a purc-
hase price. Instead, after the option is exerc-
ised, the parties are to engage in an alternating 
appraisal process to arrive at a price, begin-
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ning with an appraiser selected by the seller. 
The final pricing step is that "any appraisal 
agreed to by two of the three appraisers shall 
be binding on the parties hereto absent 
fraud." No time frame or deadline is specified 
for the appraisal process. When this process 
yields a purchase price, the agreement provides 
alternative payment terms: (1) in cash; (2) 120 
equal monthly payments with interest; or (3) 
such other terms as may be agreed to by the 
parties. The agreement contains no provision 
or time frame for delivery of the stock. 
Reagan served Webb with a notice of 
R.O.A.'s exercise of its option dated January 
27, 1987. The notice did not identify any 
price, select any terms of payment, or propose 
any time frame for the stock conveyance. 
Reagan's notice invited Webb to meet with 
him at Webb's earliest convenience "to discuss 
information which I have concerning the value 
of the R.O.A. General, Inc. stock" and other 
aspects of the transaction. 
According to the facts set forth by Webb in 
affidavits filed in support of his motion for 
partial summary judgment, Webb pledged his 
stock in March 1987, at R.O.A.'s request, to 
secure a bank loan to R.O.A. On April 20, 
1987, Webb submitted to R.O.A. a written 
request to examine the corporate books and 
records pursuant to section 16-10-47 in 
order to protect his interests as a shareholder 
and determine R.O.A.'s actual financial 
condition. R.O.A.'s vice president of admin-
istration and finance responded in a letter 
dated May 5, 1987, suggesting that Webb (1) 
postpone the inspection a few weeks because 
of the departure of a key employee in the 
accounting department, (2) specify which 
records were to be examined, and (3) wait a 
few weeks until Reagan returned to town. 
Webb, through one of his accountants, then 
sent an itemized list of the specific records and 
documents he wanted to examine. 
On May 20, 1987, Webb's counsel sent a 
letter notifying R.O.A. of the appraiser sele-
cted and of Webb's intent to proceed with the 
inspection of the corporate records on May 
27, 1987, a normal business day, beginning at 
10:00 a.m. On May 26, R.O.A.'s counsel, 
William Adams, delivered to the offices of 
Webb's counsel a letter stating that the books 
would be made available for inspection when 
the selected appraiser, not other accountants, 
wanted to examine them. Webb's counsel and 
accountants proceeded to R.O.A.'s corporate 
offices on May 27, as planned, but were 
refused access to the books and records by 
Adams, after consultation with Reagan. 
On May 29, Webb commenced this lawsuit. 
On June 3, 1987, his counsel submitted to 
R.O.A. another written notice of Webb's 
intent to have his accountants inspect the 
corporate records, this time on June 5, 1987. 
Webb's counsel was informed by Adams on 
June 4 that the inspection would not be 
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allowed by. R.O.A. because it would disrupt 
business and there was no staff person avail-
able to find the company's files. This refusal 
was confirmed in a letter from Adams that 
afternoon stating that R.O.A. staff would be 
available one-half day each day for the week 
commencing June 15,1987. 
Webb's counsel and accountants appeared 
at R.O.A. offices at 9:00 a.m. on June 15, but 
were again refused access to the books and 
records by Reagan and Hall, another R.O.A. 
attorney, who asserted for the first time that 
Webb had no inspection right because of 
R.O.A.'s January 1987 notice of its exercise 
of the stock purchase option. 
Webb then amended his complaint to add 
allegations about the two June refusals. In his 
second cause of action, he requested recovery 
of a statutory penalty under section 16-10-
47(c) against R.O.A., and against Reagan and 
Adams separately for each of the three refu-
sals of inspection. He also sought injunctive 
relief to enforce his inspection rights under 
section 16-1047(b). His ensuing motion for 
partial summary judgment on this cause of 
action was filed only against R.O.A. and 
Reagan, although he specifically reserved the 
right to proceed subsequently against Adams 
and Hall. 
In their cross-motion for partial summary 
judgment, R.O.A. and Reagan argued Webb's 
statutory right to examine the corporate books 
terminated as a matter of law when R.O.A. 
gave notice of exercise of its option to purc-
hase his stock, even though he was still shown 
on the corporate books as a holder of twenty 
percent of the stock and had neither endorsed, 
delivered, or received payment for his shares. 
They also filed the affidavits of Reagan and 
R.O.A.'s vice president in opposition to 
Webb's motion, purporting to create material 
issues of fact about the reasonableness of their 
refusal of his inspection requests, even if he 
retained his inspection rights under the statute. 
The affiants, however, did not deny the facts 
asserted in Webb's supporting affidavits, 
including the fact that Webb had been refused 
access to the books and records on May 27, 
June 4, and June 15. They merely claimed that 
Webb had been provided monthly financial 
statements and access to the corporate records 
prior to July 1986 and asserted that his requ-
ests were not reasonable, citing several excuses 
for the refusals, such as lack of key personnel 
and disruption of the business. They also 
argued that Webb's requests were vexatious 
and went beyond the information he really 
needed. In his affidavit, Reagan accused Webb 
of making the requests in bad faith to harass 
the corporation. No facts were asserted to 
support these conclusory claims or to dispute 
the purpose asserted by Webb, i.e., to protect 
his interests as minority shareholder and det-
ermine the true financial condition of the 
corporation. Affiant Reagan did dispute 
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Webb's assertion that his stock was worth 
more than $50,000, contending that, even if 
there was a refusal of Webb's lawful inspec-
tion demand, the statutory penalty could not 
be calculated until the value of Webb's shares 
was determined according to the terms of their 
agreement. 
The trial court agreed with the respondents 
and held that Webb's inspection right and his 
status as a shareholder of record under section 
16-10-47(b) terminated when R.O.A. exer-
cised its purchase option. That ruling presents 
a narrow legal issue of first impression in 
Utah. 
Section 16-10-47(b) provides: 
Any person who is a shareholder! 1] 
of record, upon written demand 
stating the purpose thereof, shall 
have the right to examine, in 
person, or by agent or attorney, at 
any reasonable time or times, for 
any proper purpose, its books and 
records of account, minutes and 
record of shareholders and to make 
extracts therefrom. A prope» 
purpose means a purpose reason-
ably related to the person's interest 
as a shareholder. 
On appeal, we review the trial court's con-
clusions of law for correctness, with no part-
icular deference to the trial court. Creer v. 
Valley Bank & Trust, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 
(1988); Western Kane County Special Serv. 
Dist. No. I v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 
1376, 1378 (Utah 1987). That same lack of 
deference applies to the trial court's interpr-
etation of an unambiguous, integrated cont-
ract, Zion's First Nat'I Bank v. National Am. 
Title & Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 
1988), and to its interpretation of statutes, 
Bonham v. Morgan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 
(1989); Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 
1988), both of which present questions of law. 
The issue central to this appeal is the nature 
of the contract the parties intended to create 
at the time of the exercise of R.O.A.'s purc-
hase option. See Taylor v. Daynes, 118 Utah 
61, 218 P.2d 1069, 1072 (1950); Jones v. 
Commercial In v. Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 P. 
896, 900 (1924). That intent must be determ-
ined as a matter of law from the nature and 
text of the entire written agreement itself, if 
possible. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); accord 12A Flet-
cher Cyc. Corp. §5613 (1984). In other 
words, did the parties intend title to Webb's 
stock to be transferred to R.O.A. upon exer-
cise of the option, leaving executory only their 
respective purchase and sale obligations under 
the contract?2 Or did they intend that exercise 
of the option would create a wholly executory 
contract to sell the shares, with title to remain 
in Webb until transferred to R.O.A. at some 
subsequent time? 
Here, the agreement of the parties did not 
specify the time for transfer of legal title to 
Webb's shares or their actual delivery. But it 
did leave open for determination, after exer-
cise of R.O.A.'s purchase option, both the 
purchase price and the final terms of payment, 
without specifying the time frame for the 
completion of those determinations. Thus, the 
parties recognized there must be further agr-
eement on each of these terms after R.O.A.*s 
notice. These terms and the parties' use of the 
potentially lengthy appraisal process to set the 
price of Webb's stock compel the conclusion 
that they did not intend that Webb would 
immediately divest himself of legal ownership 
of the shares at the moment the option was 
exercised, but that he would retain legal title 
until some later time when these essential 
terms of the sale were completed. It is thus 
clear from the agreement itself that the parties 
intended legal ownership to transfer to R.O.A. 
at some point after notice was given, concur-
rent with a subsequent event, such as full 
payment or commencement of installment 
payments.3 
This interpretation of the parties' agreement 
is buttressed by the uncontroverted facts that 
Webb pledged his stock at R.O.A.'s request 
even after R.O.A.'s notice of exercise of its 
option and, at least until June 15, R.O.A. and 
Reagan treated Webb as the legal owner of the 
shares. It is also consistent with the conclus-
ions of other courts in cases involving similar 
agreements and similar inspection rights. 
For example, in Estate of Bishop v. Antilles 
Enters., Inc., 252 F.2d 498 (3rd Cir. 1958), the 
shareholders of the respondent corporation 
entered into a cross-purchase agreement 
providing that, upon the death of shareholder 
Bishop, the surviving shareholders had the 
option to purchase his shares from his estate 
at book value. Following Bishop's death, 
Vose, one of the surviving shareholders, ass-
erted his right to purchase Bishop's stock 
from his estate. Vose claimed the stock was 
worthless and tendered $1.00 in payment. The 
district court held that the estate was entitled, 
as a holder of legal title, to exercise its 
common law right to examine the corpora-
tion's books and records. On appeal, the 
respondent corporation contended that "by 
virtue of the agreement between the stockho-
lders, title to and ownership of Bishop's stock 
had passed to Vose immediately upon the 
election of the latter to purchase it." Id. at 
499. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
the corporation's argument and held that, 
even assuming Vose's election of the option to 
purchase the stock vested his right to transfer 
of the stock upon payment of the purchase 
price, it did not divest the estate administrator 
of legal title to the shares or of the rights of a 
stockholder. Id. Moreover, the court concl-
uded, assuming the agreement to sell the stock 
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was valid and binding, 
the [administrator's] right ... to 
have access to the books and 
records of the corporation certainly 
will continue at least until after the 
proper amount of the purchase 
price has been authoritatively dete-
rmined and has been paid. Until 
then it is obvious that the petitioner 
has a very real interest in securing 
accurate information as to the state 
of the respondent corporation's 
accounts.... 
Id. 
Similarly, in Knaebel v. Heiner, 673 P.2d 
885 (Alaska 1983), a shareholder, Knaebel, 
had executed a valid contract that called for 
the exchange of his shares (for stock in 
another corporation) prior to the date of his 
demand for inspection. Heiner, custodian of 
the corporation's records, refused Knaebel's 
written demand for inspection of the books 
and records under a statute extending that 
right to a "shareholder of record for at least 
six months" or a "holder of record of at least 
Vive percent of all the outstanding shares of a 
corporation." Id. at 885 & n.l. Heiner argued 
that, if there was a valid contract calling for 
the exchange of Knaebel's stock on a certain 
date prior to his demand for inspection, he 
could have no right of inspection after that 
date. Id. at 886. 
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court rej-
ected this argument and held that the contract 
was executory until the exchange of the shares 
actually took place. Thus, the agreement by 
itself did not cancel Knaebel's status as a 
shareholder of record for purposes of the 
inspection statute, "any more than a land sale 
contract which specifies a date for closing 
cancels a recorded deed on the specified date." 
Id. at 887. See also Shelters, Inc. v. Mankin, 
130 Ga. App. 859, 204 S.E.2d 810 (1974) 
(executory contract to sell stock to third party 
did not deprive shareholder of statutory right 
of inspection); Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber 
Co., 199 Okla. 672, 189 P.2d 929 (1948) 
(despite corporation's exercise of option to 
purchase stock, shareholder retained title as 
legal owner together with statutory right of 
inspection). 
We conclude that the contract formed when 
the notice of exercise of option was given to 
Webb constituted a contract to sell the shares, 
with legal title remaining in Webb after that 
point in time. Accordingly, R.O.A.'s notice of 
exercise of its option pursuant to the parties' 
agreement did not terminate Webb's status as 
a shareholder of record for purposes of 
section 16-10-47(b). The trial court erred in 
ruling otherwise. 
We next address briefly R.O.A.'s claim that 
Webb waived or contracted away his statutory 
right of inspection because the parties' agre-
ement provided for an appraisal procedure to 
be followed after the option notice was served. 
Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. Hunter v. Hu uerf 669 P.2d 430, 
431 (Utah 1983). "It must be distinctly made, 
although it may be express or implied." Id. 
(quoting American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. 
Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3 
(1968)). Assuming the statutory right could be 
contracted away consistent with public policy, 
R.O.A. has not identified any contract prov-
ision which either expressly or impliedly 
waives or modifies Webb's statutory inspec-
tion right. Indeed, Section 16 of their agree-
ment, captioned "Rights of Ownership," 
states, "The Stockholders shall retain all their 
rights as stockholders of the Corporation, 
except those specifically modified by this 
Agreement." We conclude there was no waiver 
or contractual surrender of Webb's rights as a 
shareholder under section 16-10-47. 
We turn now to the issue of statutory pen-
alties against R.O.A. and Reagan. Utah Code 
Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1987) provides: 
Any officer or agent who, or a 
corporation which, shall refuse to 
allow any such shareholder, or his 
agent or attorney, so to examine 
and make extracts from its books 
and records of account, minutes, 
and record of shareholders, for any 
proper purpose, shall be liable to 
such shareholder in a penalty of 
10% of the value of the shares 
owned by such shareholder, in 
addition to any other damages or 
remedy afforded him by law; but 
no such penalty shall exceed $5,000. 
It shall be a defense to any action 
for penalties under this section that 
the person suing therefor has within 
two years sold or offered for sale 
any list of shareholders of such 
corporation or any other corpora-
tion or has aided or abetted any 
person in procuring any list of 
shareholders for any such purpose, 
or has improperly used any infor-
mation secured through any prior 
examination of the books and 
records of account, or minutes, or 
record of shareholders of such 
corporation or any other corpora-
tion, or was not acting in good 
faith or for a proper purpose in 
making his demand. 
As a shareholder of record, Webb had a right 
to examine the corporate books pursuant to 
section l6-10-47(b) at a reasonable time 
upon written demand.4 The statute limits the 
shareholder's inspection right only insofar as 
the requested examination must be for a 
"proper purpose," defined in that subsection 
as one "reasonably related to the person's 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
A-5 
CODE* Co 
Provo, Uuh 
Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc. 
106 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 51 
interest as a shareholder." 
There is no question that Webb made the 
necessary written demands for inspection of 
R.O.A.'s books and records at reasonable 
times, i.e., during normal business hours. See 
Clawson v. Clayton, 33 Utah 266, 272, 93 P. 
729, 731 (1908). Based on the undisputed facts 
inthe record, we find that, as a matter of law, 
Webb's inspection requests were for a proper 
purpose within the meaning of the act, 
namely, to determine the corporation's true 
financial condition and thereby protect his 
interests as a minority shareholder in the 
process of selling his shares. 
In their response to Webb's motion for 
partial summary judgment, R.O.A. and 
Reagan did not dispute the stated facts conc-
erning the direct refusals of Webb's demands 
for inspection on three occasions. Instead, 
their supporting affidavits merely offered 
excuses which, even if true, would not estab-
lish any of the defenses to an action for pen-
alties enumerated in section 16-10-47(c), 
and made conclusory allegations of bad faith 
without asserting any supportive facts.5 See 
Brigham Truck & Implement Co. v. Fridal, 
746 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 1987); Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985). 
R.O.A.'s and Reagan's repeated stall 
tactics, first leading Webb to believe inspec-
tion would be granted, then refusing access to 
the books at the agreed-upon time for spec-
ious, fluid reasons, represent exactly the type 
of conduct by a corporation or its officers or 
agents that the statute is designed to curtail 
through the imposition of penalties. Without 
sanctions to discourage the refusal of proper 
inspection requests, the corporation or its 
officers "could, by refusing access, delay ins-
pection until the right was actually litigated." 
2 Model Business Corporation Act §52 
commentary at 129(2ded. 1971). 
Section 16-10-47(c) clearly authorizes the 
imposition of a penalty for each refusal to 
•allow inspection. Unlike the shareholders in 
Meyer v. Ford Industries, Inc., 272 Or. 531, 
538 P.2d 353 (1975), who sought the imposi-
tion of eight statutory penalties because that 
was the number of items they had asked to 
inspect, Webb made three separate and inde-
pendent requests, which were separately 
refused. We agree with Webb that, if the 
statute is to have any deterrent effect, viola-
ting parties should not be permitted to purc-
hase multiple and serial exemptions from the 
law's mandate for a one-time penalty fee, 
regardless of how often they refuse distinct, 
lawful shareholder demands for inspection of 
the corporate records.* 
Based on the undisputed facts in the record, 
Reagan, as an individual, and R.O.A., as an 
entity, each participated in the May 27 and 
June 15 refusals; R.O.A., as an entity, was a 
participant in the June 4 refusal, while 
Reagan, as an individual, was not. See gene-
rally 5A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. §2256 (1987). 
Webb is, therefore, entitled to partial 
summary judgment against each responsible 
respondent in the amount of the mandatory 
statutory penalty for each of the three separate 
refusals to allow him to exercise his inspection 
rights as a shareholder. 
Because the statute sets the amount of each 
penalty at ten percent of the value of the 
shareholder's shares plus other damages, not 
to exceed $5,000, and the parties' agreement 
dictates that the value of Webb's shares is to 
be determined through the appraisal process, 
the amount of each penalty must be fixed by 
the trial court on remand after the valuation is 
complete and Webb has been afforded an 
opportunity to present evidence concerning 
any other damages to which he is entitled.. 
The partial summary judgment entered in 
favor of respondents is reversed. The case is 
remanded for entry of partial summary judg-
ment against Reagan and R.O.A., in accord-
ance with this opinion, and for further proc-
eedings to determine the amount of the stat-
utory penalty to be imposed on them for each 
of the three separate wrongful refusals to 
permit inspection of the corporate books and 
records. In addition, the district court is dir-
ected to grant forthwith Webb's request for 
injunctive relief enforcing his statutory inspe-
ction right. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. The Act defines a shareholder as "one who is a 
holder of record of shares in a corporation." Utah 
Code Ann. §16-10-2(15) (1987) (redesignated as 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-2(11) (1988)). 
2. The issue presented in Taylor v. Daynes, 118 
Utah 61, 218 P.2d 1069 (1950), was whether oral 
negotiations about the sale of stock, coupled with 
the parties' conduct and a written memorandum, 
constituted an executory contract to purchase the 
stock or a present purchase and sale accompanied 
by an immediate transfer of interest when the stock 
certificates were handed over to the purchaser. The 
trial court's finding that the parties intended a 
contract of immediate sale and purchase was upheld 
by the Utah Supreme Court as supported by the 
evidence at trial. Taylor, 218 P.2d at 1072. In an 
earlier case involving the interpretation of a written 
agreement by an employer to repurchase stock sold 
to an employee if the employee was discharged, the 
court determined that the parties had intended title 
to the stocks to transfer to the employer immedia-
tely upon the occurrence of the condition subseq-
uent, i.e., the employee's discharge. Davies v. 
Semloh Hotel, 86 Utah 318,44 P.2d 689 (1935). 
3. In the context of a preliminary agreement for the 
sale of an apartment building, the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated: 
There is implied in an agreement for the 
sale of real estate, unless a contrary 
intention is expressed, that the vendor 
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shall retain title until the balance of the 
purchase price is paid Where there is an 
agreement on the part of one to convey 
and on the part of another to pay a 
definite sum, payment and conveyance 
are concurrent acts, unless a contrary 
intention appears 
Johnson v Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P 2d 893, 895 
(1946) 
4 Any corporate agent or officer with custody or 
control of corporate books who refuses a bona fide 
shareholder's lawful demand for their inspection or 
copying is also guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
Utah Code Ann §76-10-708(1978) 
5 In a second affidavit filed with the trial court, 
Reagan sought to justify the refusals on the basis 
that the records Webb sought to examine were 
confidential This fact alone, however, is insufficient 
to deny the statutory inspection right See Fc&rs v 
Cattlemen's Inv Co, 483 P 2d 724, 730 (Okla 
1971) 
6 By the same token, penalties should not be arti-
ficially compounded by identical, repetitious requ-
ests that prompt multiple, predictable refusals Form 
is not to be elevated over substance in determining 
the number of independent requests made by a 
shareholder of record, each of which qualifies for a 
separate penalty if refused There might be cases in 
which multiple "requests'* would be more properly 
regarded as a single request repeatedly renewed 
However, this is not such a case It is clear that 
three separate requests were made by Webb and 
refused, as evidenced by the passage of time 
between requests and the inconsistent variety of 
responses Webb's first request to examine the 
books and records on May 27 was denied for the 
express reason that only Webb's appraiser, not his 
accountants, was a proper agent His June 3 inspe-
ction request, on the other hand, was denied 
because it would be disruptive and no staff was 
available to find the necessary files, which had been 
identified by Webb in early May Instead, Webb 
was informed, the inspection would proceed on June 
15, with R O A staff available at that time When 
Webb's agents appeared on June 15, as instructed, 
access to the corporate records was again refused, 
this time because of Webb's alleged lack of 
"shareholder of record" status 
Cite as 
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Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Greg Phillip Casias was convi-
cted by a jury of burglary in violation of Utah 
Code Ann §76-6-202(1) (1978), and two 
counts of second degree theft in violation of 
Utah Code Ann §76-6-404 (1978) Casias 
appeals from his convictions claiming the trial 
court erred in allowing 1) photocopies of his 
palm prints into evidence, and 2) the State to 
charge him for two counts of theft under §76-
6-404, theft of a firearm, a second degree 
felony under §76-6-412(lXaXu), and theft 
of property valued in excess of $1,000, a 
s e c o n d degree fe lony u n d e r §76-6 -
412(l)(a)(i), which arose from the same crim-
inal episode Although we affirm Casias* s 
convictions for burglary and one count of* 
second degree theft, we find submitting two 
counts of theft to the jury and the resulting 
convictions thereon was error We, therefore, 
remand the matter to the tnal court to vacate 
one of the theft convictions. 
FACTS 
On May 14, 1987, a private residence in 
Summit Park, Utah, was burglarized Items 
reported missing included personal property 
worth over $1,000 and a .25-caliber autom-
atic pistol. Dunng the investigation, police 
officers found a beer can m the bedroom of 
the homeowner's daughter. The beer can was 
sent to the state crime lab to recover latent 
fingerprints. The fingerprint expert at the lab 
recovered a left palm print and several finge-
"rpnnts from the can. 
On May 28, 1987, the Salt Lake County 
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CERTIFIED MAIL and 
HAND DELIVERED 
Mr. Roland Webb and 
Mrs. Bessie P. Webb 
1837 Baywood Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Dear Roland and Bessie: 
This letter is to notify you that R.O.A. General, Inc. is hereby 
exercising its option under paragraph 11 of that Agreement by and 
between William K. Reagan, Roland Webb, Bessie P. Webb and R.O.A. 
General, Inc. to purchase all of the R.O.A. General, Inc. stock 
owned by the two of you. 
At your earliest convenience, we should meet to discuss 
information which I have concerning the value of the R.O.A. 
General, Inc. stock. Also, we need to discuss the other aspects 
of the transaction. 
Very truly yours, 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. 
President 
WKR/so 
- i ^ 
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AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made this _/ day of July, 1981, by and 
among WILLIAM K. REAGAN, hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
"Reagan" and ROLAND WEBB and BESSIE P. WEBB, hereinafter sometimes 
collectively referred to as "Webb", all of the above hereinafter 
sometimes referred to collectively as "the Stockholders" and each 
singly as "Stockholder", and R.O.A. General, Inc., d/b/a Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, a Utah corporation, hereinafter referred to as 
"the Corporation", 
Recitals: 
A, The Stockholders, as incorporators, will organize a 
corporation under the laws of the State of Utah, the Corporation, 
for the purpose of engaging in operating an outdoor advertising 
business, including the borrowing of money for such purpose, and to 
engage in any other lawful business activity. 
B. The Stockholders will own all of the outstanding common 
stock of the Corporation, hereinafter, including any such stock 
issued hereafter, referred to as the "Stock," 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises 
herein contained and for other good and valuable consideration, the 
parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Sale of Stock. Reagan hereby agrees to sell to Webb 
shares of stock of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. The amount of 
stock shall be determined based upon the relative net worth of 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc. on the date the Corporation purchases the stock of Galaxy 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. which is not owned by Webb, hereinafter 
referred to as "Closing Date". It has been agreed that the value of 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. is $3,163,202 plus the amount of 
cash, prepaid expenses, and the value of notes and accounts 
receivables as of the Closing Date minus all liabilities at the 
Closing Date, and the value of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. is 
$5,100,000 plus the amount of cash, prepaid expenses, and the value 
%.* ° 
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of notes and accounts receivables as of the Closing Date minus all 
liabilities, excluding deferred income taxes, at the Closing Date. 
Current assets and liabilities of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
and Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. shall be determined using 
consistent accounting principles. The value of the stock to be 
purchased by Webb shall be the difference between (i) the value of 
Webb's stock in Galaxy Advertising, Inc. minus $255,727 divided by 
20 percent; and (ii) the total value of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc. and Webb's stock in Galaxy Advertising, Inc. The purchase 
price shall be paid by a demand promissory note with interest at the 
rate provided in paragraph 12.2(c) (ii). Provided, however, Reagan 
shall not be required to sell stock that would result in his owning 
less than 66-2/3 percent of the stock of the Corporation. 
2. Subscription for Stock. 
2.1 Stock Issued to Reagan. In exchange for all of 
the shares of stock of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. owned by 
Reagan, after making the sale as provided in paragraph 1 above, 
the Corporation shall issue to Reagan such shares that his 
percentage ownership of the outstanding stock of the Corporation 
shall equal the percentage determined by div.iding (i) the value 
of the Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. stock, as defined in 
paragraph 1, being contributed; by (ii) the total value of 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and the value of Webb's stock 
of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., as defined in paragraph 1. 
2.2 Stock Issued to Webb. In exchange for all of the 
shares of stock of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. owned by Webb, after making the 
purchase as provided in paragraph 1 above, the Corporation shall 
issue to Webb such shares that his percentage ownership of the 
outstanding stock of the Corporation shall equal the percentage 
determined by dividing (i) the value of the Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc. stock and the Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
stock, as defined in paragraph 1, being contributed; by (ii) the 
total value of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and the value of 
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Webb's stock of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., as defined in 
paragraph 1. 
3. Pledge of Stock. No Stockholder shall, at any time, 
transfer any-of his or her stock to any person other than the 
Corporation, or a corporation which is a member of an affiliated 
group, as amended, which includes the Corporation, hereinafter 
referred to as a "Subsidiary", as security for any loan or other 
obligation unless such Stockholder shall first obtain the written 
consent of the holders of at least a majority of the Stock then 
outstanding, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. In 
the event stock is pledged to the Corporation or a Subsidiary, such 
pledgee shall be subject to paragraph 5 of this Agreement in the 
event of any sale of such Stock by-such pledgee. 
4. Gifts of Stock. No Stockholder shall transfer any of 
his or her Stock other than for a valuable consideration (in which 
event such transfer shall be subject to the provisions of either 
paragraph 3 or 5 hereof) to any person other than (i) the 
Corporation, or (ii) a Stockholder's spouse, one or more of his or 
her lineal descendants, or a trust ot which the foregoing or any of 
them are the primary beneficiaries and such person(s) has agreed in 
a writing filed with the Secretary of the Corporation prior to such 
transfer to be bound by all the terms of this Agreement in all 
respects as though such person were originally a party hereto, 
unless such Stockholder shall first obtain the written consent to 
such transfer of the holders of a majority of the Stock then 
outstanding, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
5. Rights of First Refusal Upon Any Sale of Stock. 
5.1 Notice of Intended Transfer. Any Stockholder who 
intends to transfer any of his or her Stock for a valuable 
consideration to any person other than the Corporation (as 
hereinafter defined) shall give seventy (70) days' prior written 
notice of such intended transfer, hereinafter referred to as 
"the Notice", to the Corporation and to each Stockholder* The 
NrtH,-- 4« » ^ ^ ' - to stating the fact of the intention so to 
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transfer such Stock, shall state (i) the number of shares of 
Stock to be transferred, (ii) the name, business and residence 
address of the proposed transferee, and (iii) the amount or 
market value of the consideration, hereinafter referred to as 
the "Price", and all other terms of the intended transfer. 
5.2 Primary Options to Purchase. At any time within 
thirty (30) days after receipt of the Notice by the Corporation, 
the Corporation shall have the option to purchase all of the 
Stock described in the Notice for the Price and upon terms not 
less favorable to the Corporation than those granted the 
proposed transferee. Provided, however, if the proposed 
transfer would not result in the recognition of gain for income 
tax purposes, the price shall be increased to include the amount 
of tax liability the Stockholder would recognize upon the 
exercise of the Option. Such option shall be exercisable by the 
Corporation giving the transferring Stockholder, prior to the 
expiration of said thirty (30) day period, a written notice of 
its exercise of its option with respect to all of the Stock 
described in the Notice. If the Corporation does not exercise 
the option, it shall, not later than five (5) days after the 
expiration of said thirty (30) day period, advise each 
Stockholder (other than the transferring Stockholder) of the 
date on which the Corporation received the Notice and of that 
such option was not so exercised by the Corporation; provided, 
however, that any failure or delay of the Corporation in giving 
such advice to such Stockholders shall not in any way affect the 
options of such Stockholders with respect to such Stock. 
Any time within sixty (60) days after receipt of the 
Notice by the Corporation, each Stockholder then holding Stock 
(other than the transferring Stockholder) shall have the option 
to purchase, for the Price and upon terms not less favorable to 
such Stockholder than those granted the proposed transferee, all 
or any portion of that proportion of the Stock described in the 
Notice with respect to which the Corporation has not exercised 
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its option which equals the proportion which the number of 
shares of Stock owned by such Stockholder at the time of receipt 
of the Notice by the Corporation is of the total number of 
shares of Stock then owned by all such Stockholders, Each such 
option shall be exercisable by the exercising Stockholder giving 
the transferring Stockholder and the Corporation, prior to the 
expiration of said sixty (60) day period, a written notice of 
their exercise of such option. 
The options granted under this paragraph 5,2 are 
sometimes hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Primary 
Options" and singly as the "Primary Option". 
5.3 Secondary Options to Purchaser. If, upon the 
expiration of sixty (60) days'after receipt of the Notice by the 
Corporation, the Primary Options have not been exercised as 
hereinabove provided with respect to all of the Stock described 
in the Notice, each Stockholder who has theretofore exercised 
his or her Primary Option as to all Stock which was subject 
thereto shall have the further, option to purchase, for the Price 
and upon terms not less favorable to such Stockholder than those 
granted the proposed transferee, any shares of the Stock 
described in the Notice with respect to which the Primary 
Options were not exercised, hereinafter referred to as the 
"Secondary Option Shares". Such further options are hereinafter 
sometimes referred to collectively as the "Secondary Options" 
and singly as the "Secondary Option". 
If, under the foregoing provisions of this paragraph 
5.3, only one Stockholder shall have a Secondary Option, then 
such Secondary Option shall be exercisable with respect to all 
or any portion of the number of Secondary Option Shares which 
bears the same proportion to the total number of such Secondary 
Option Shares as the number of shares of such Stock owned at the 
time of receipt by the Corporation of the Notice by each 
Stockholder having a Secondary Option bears to .the total number 
of shares of such Stock then owned by all Stockholders having a 
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Secondary Option; provided, however, that all such Stockholders 
having a Secondary Option may by agreement among themselves 
determine the proportions in which some or all of them may 
exercise^their respective Secondary Options. 
Each Secondary Option shall be exercisable by the 
exercising Stockholder giving the transferring Stockholder and 
the Corporation a written notice of such exercise at any time 
within seventy (70) days after receipt of the Notice by the 
Corporation. 
5.4 Condition of Exercise of Primary and Secondary 
Options. A condition precedent to the exercise of the Primary 
and Secondary Options shall be that all Stock being offered for 
transfer must be purchased pursuant to the exercise of the 
Primary and Secondary Options. 
5.5 Transfer After Termination of Options. Any Stock 
with respect to which none of the options hereinabove provided 
for has been exercised may be transferred by the transferring 
Stockholder to the proposed transferee free of any rights or 
duties created by this Agreement*provided that such transfer is 
completed upon the same terms specified in the Notice within 
ninety (90) days after receipt of the Notice by the Corporation. 
If for any reason said transfer J.S not so completed within said 
ninety (90) day period, then the transferring Stockholder may 
not thereafter transfer any such Stock without giving a new 
Notice as provided in paragraph 5.1 hereof, in which event such 
Stock shall again become subject to all of the options 
hereinabove provided for. Provided, however, if Reagan proposes 
to transfer Stock representing 50 percent or more of the Stock 
of the Corporation and options hereinabove provided have not 
been exercised, prior to the transfer of such Stock, Reagan 
shall provide that Webb's Stock can be transferred, at Webb's 
option, on the same terms and conditions. 
5.6 If the transferring Stockholder ,dies within the 
seventy (70) days period referred to in paragraph 5.1 of this 
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Agreement, the provisions of paragraphs 6,1 through 7.2 of this 
Agreement, inclusive, shall become applicable to all Stock owned 
by such transferring Stockholder other than Stock, if any, 
subject to an option under this paragraph 5 which has been 
exercised pursuant to the terms of this Agreement prior to the 
death of such Stockholder. 
6. Options and Transfers After Death of Reagan. 
6.1 Upon the death of Reagan, at the election of 
Reagan's personal representative, the Corporation shall be 
required to purchase all or part of the Stock owned by Reagan at 
the time of his death, as hereinafter provided, if all of the 
following conditions precedent have been or are concurrently 
satisfied: 
(a) This Agreement continues in effect and has 
not been terminated as provided in paragraph 15. 
(b) Within a reasonable time after the death of 
Reagan but within nine (9) months an authorized 
representative (being one or more persons having 
responsibility to file a return to pay Federal estate tax) 
makes an application in writing either to the Board of 
Directors of the Corporation or to any one or more of the 
officers of the Corporation for benefits under this 
paragraph and tenders to the Corporation the Stock to be 
redeemed, 
6.2 All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 6 
shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12. 
7. Options and Tranfers after Death of Webb. 
7.1 Upon the death of Webb, at the election of Webb's 
personal representative, the Corporation shall be required to 
purchase all or part of the Stock owned by Webb at such time, as 
hereinafter provided, if all of the following conditions 
precedent have been or are concurrently satisfied: 
(a) This Agreement continues in effect and has 
not been terminated as provided in paragraph 15. 
.«-:> 
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(b) Within a reasonable time after the death of 
Webb, but within nine (9) months an authorized 
representative of Webb (being one or more persons having 
responsibility to file a return to pay Federal estate tax) 
makes an application in writing either to the Board of 
Directors of the Corporation or to any one or more of the 
officers of the Corporation for benefits under this 
paragraph and tenders to the Corporation the Stock to be 
redeemed. 
7.2 All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 7 
shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12. 
8. Options and Transfers After August 1, 1981. 
8.1 At any time after August 1, 1981 the Corporation 
shall have the option to purchase such amount of stock owned by 
Webb that would reduce his ownership of the outstanding stock of 
the Corporation to 20 percent, or such additional stock as is 
necessary to cause the redemption to qualify as a sale or 
exchange under Section 302(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, but 
not less than such amount. Such'option shall be exercisable by 
giving Webb written notice of such exercise. Provided, however, 
the Corporation may only exercise such option if such redemption 
qualifies as a sale or exchange under Section 302(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
8.2 All redemptions of stock under this paragraph 8 
shall be upon terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12. 
9. Options and Transfers After August 1, 1986 and 
Thereafter. 
9.1 On August 1, 1986, and on August 1 in each 
succeeding year at the election of Webb, the Corporation shall 
be required to purchase as much as 20 percent of the Stock, 
owned by Webb on August 1, 1986, or such additional Stock as may 
be necessary to qualify such redemption as a sale or exchange 
under Section 302(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, as 
hereinafter provided, if all of the following conditions 
precedent have been or are concurrently satisfied: 
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(a) This Agreement continues in effect and has 
not been terminated as provided in paragraph 15. 
(b) Within five months after such date, Webb 
makes an application in writing either to the Board of 
Directors of the Corporation or to any one or more of the 
officers of the Corporation for benefits under this 
paragraph and tenders to the Corporation the Stock to be 
redeemed. 
9.2 All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 9 
shall be upon terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12. 
10. Options Upon Death of Webb. 
10.1 Upon the death of Webb the Corporation shall 
have the option to purchase all -but not less than all the Stock 
owned by Webb at such time of his death. Such option shall be 
exercisable by giving his personal representative written notice 
of such exercise at any time within six (6) months after the 
date of his death. If the Corporation does not so exercise its 
option, the Corporation shall, not later than five (5) days 
after the expiration of said six (6) month period, advise each 
Stockholder that such option was not so exercised by the 
Corporation; provided, however, that any failure or delay of the 
Corporation in giving such advice to such Stockholders shall not 
in any way affect the options of such Stockholders with respect 
to such Stock. 
At any time within sixty (60) days, with respect to a 
Primary Option, or seventy (70) days, with respect to a 
Secondary Option, after receipt of the Notice by the 
Corporation, each Stockholder shall have a Primary Option and, 
if applicable, a Secondary Option to purchase all or any portion 
of the Stock described in the Notice with respect to which the 
Corporation has not exercised its option, which Primary Options 
and Secondary Options shall be exercisable in the same manner 
and proportions as, and subject to the same ter^ms and 
conditions, provided for in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3 of this 
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Agreement except that (i) all notices of the exercise of any 
such option shall be given to his personal representative, (ii) 
the time periods for exercising such options shall be measured 
by reference to the time of receipt by the Corporation of the 
Notice hereinabove referred to, (iii) the "Price* shall in each 
instance, be the market value of the Stock with respect to which 
the partiuclar option has been exercised. 
10,2 All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 10 
shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12. 
11. Options Upon August 1, 1986 and Thereafter. 
11.1 At August 1, 1986 and on such date in each 
succeeding year the Corporation shall have the option to 
purchase all or part of the Stock owned by Webb on such date, 
provided the Corporation must purchase sufficient Stock to have 
the redemption qualify as an exchange under section 302(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. Such option 
shall be exercisable by giving Webb written notice of such 
exercise at any time within six (6) months after such date. If 
the Corporation does not so exercise its option, the Corporation 
shall, not later than five (5) days after the expiration of said 
six (6) month period, advise each Stockholder of the date on 
which the Corporation that such option was not so exercised by 
the Corporation; provided, however, that any failure or delay of 
the Corporation in giving such advice to such Stockholders shall 
not in any way affect the options of such Stockholders with 
respect to such Stock. 
At any time within sixty (60) days, with respect to a 
Primary Option, or seventy (70) days, with respect to a 
Secondary Option, after receipt of the Notice by the 
Corporation, each Stockholder shall have a Primary Option and, 
if applicable, a Secondary Option to purchase all or any portion 
of the Stock described in the Notice with respect to which the 
Corporation has not exercised its option, which Primary Options 
and Secondary Options shall be exercisable in the same manner 
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and proportions as, and sub3ect to the same terms and 
conditions, provided for in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3 of this 
Agreement except that (i) all notices of the exercise of any 
such option shall be given to his personal representative, (ii) 
the time periods for exercising such options shall be measured 
by reference to the time of receipt by the Corporation of the 
Notice hereinabove referred to, (iii) the "Price" shall in each 
instance, be the market value of the Stock with respect to which 
the partiuclar option has been exercised. 
11.2 All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 11 
shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12. 
12. Terms and Conditions of Purchase. 
12.1 Purchase Price. The purchase price of each 
share of stock shall be the fair market value of the stock on 
the date of purchase determined as follows: 
The Stockholder who offers to sell his stock, or 
the personal representatives of a decedent Stockholder, 
shall appoint an appraiser to appraise the value of the 
Stock. If the other parties hereto do not agree to the 
appraisal of such appraiser, such other parties shall 
appoint a second appraiser to appraise the Stock, The 
average of the two appraisals so obtained shall be used in 
determining the fair market value of the Stock, if the 
higher of the two appraisals is no more than 105 percent of 
the lower of the two appraisals; otherwise, the two 
appraisers shall appoint a third appraiser, and any 
appraisal agreed to by two of the three appraisers shall be 
binding on the parties hereto absent fraud. All appraisals 
shall be based on the normal operations of the 
Corporation. The Corporation shall pay the costs of the 
appraisals. If the Stock is purchased under this Agreement 
pursuant to options under paragraphs 10 or 11, and within 
one year of such purchase Reagan sells his stock, the 
purchase price and terms for the stock being purchased 
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shall be adjusted so as to be equal to the price and terms 
at which Reagan sold his stock. 
12.2 Payment of Purchase Price. 
(a) In the event the stock being purchased is 
being purchased upon the death of a Stockholder under 
paragraph 6, the purchase price shall be paid in cash or 
upon such other terms as may be agreed to by the parties. 
(b) In the event the stock is being purchased 
pursuant to the exercise of the option under paragraph 8, 
the purchase price shall be paid with a demand promissory 
note which shall bear interest at the rate provided in 
paragraph (c)(ii) below. 
(c) In the event the stock is being purchased 
pursuant to the exercise of options under paragraphs 9 or 
11, the purchase price shall be paid 
(i) In cash; 
(ii) In 120 equal monthly payments together 
with accrued interest with the first such payment due 
one month from the date the option is exercised. The 
interest rate shall be determined annually for 
payments due for one year following the date of 
adjustment and shall be equal to two percentage points 
over the average rate for United States Treasury Bonds 
with a 10-year maturity date for the period 15 days 
before and 15 days after the date the option was 
exercised, or for subsequent years, the anniversary 
date of such exercise. All amounts due may be prepaid 
without penalty. Provided, however, if payments are 
due under this paragraph and Reagan sells his stock in 
a transaction that is not a reorganization under 
Section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as 
amended, the payments due under this paragraph shall 
thereafter, at the option of Webb, be on the same 
payment due and terms of such sale; or 
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(iii) Upon such other terms as may be agreed 
to by the parties. 
(d) In the event the stock is being purchased 
pursuant,to the exercise of options under paragraphs 7 or 10, 
the purchase price shall be paid 
(i) In cash; 
(ii) A down payment equal to the federal estate 
tax imposed on the value of the stock included in Webb's 
estate for federal estate tax purposes based on the average 
tax rate imposed on such estate. The balance shall be paid 
as provided in paragraph (c)(ii) above; or 
(iii) Upon such other terms as may be agreed to by 
the parties. 
13. Legend on Certificates. All Stock whether now owned 
or hereafter acquired by any party to this Agreement shall be 
subject to the provisions of this Agreement, and all certificates 
representing the Stock shall bear the following legend: 
The shares represented by this Certificate are subject to and 
transferable only on compliance with an Agreement dated 
between the Corporation and its 
shareholders, a copy of which is on file at the offices of the 
Corporation. 
14. Voting Agreement. 
14.1 Voting Agreement Until August 1, 1986. The 
Stockholders hereby agree to vote their Stock at all meetings of 
the Stockholders until August 1, 1986, the death of Roland Webb 
or Reagan, or the termination of this Agreement under paragraph 
15 whichever is sooner, as follows: 
(a) To elect Reagan, Norm Clark, or such other 
person that is designated by Reagan, Webb, Duanne C. 
Karren, or such other person that is designated by Webb, 
and Gerald Gray, or such other person that is mutually 
agreed upon by Reagan and Webb as members of the Board of 
Directors. All transactions between the Corporation and a 
Shareholder, except as provided in (b) (cl and (d) below, 
shall be subject to approval by such Board of Directors. 
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(b) To have the Corporation enter into 
employment agreements with Reagan and Webb upon the terms 
set out in the agreements attached hereto as Exhibits A and 
(c) To have the Corporation sell real property, 
more particularly described on Exhibit C attached hereto, 
to Webb Investment for $548,310. 
(d) To have the Corporation lease real property, 
more particularly described on Exhibit D attached hereto, 
under a lease substantially the same as Exhibit E, attached 
hereto. 
1 4
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 Voting Agreement After August 1, 1986. The 
Stockholders hereby agree to vote their stock at all meetings of 
the Stockholders after August 1, 1986 to elect Roland Webb as a 
director so long as he owns Stock or until the death of Roland 
Webb or Reagan or the termination of this Agreement. 
15. Termination. This Agreement and all rights and 
duties provided for hereunder shall terminate upon the occurrence of 
any of the following events: 
(a) The bankruptcy or dissolution of the Corporation; 
(b) A single Stockholder becoming the owner of all 
Stock of the Corporation which is then subject to this Agreement; 
(c) Execution of a written instrument by the holders 
of all of the Stock outstanding which terminates this Agreement. 
The termination of this Agreement for any reason shall not 
affect any right or remedy existing hereunder prior to the effective 
date of such termination. 
16. Rights of Ownership. The Stockholders shall retain 
all their rights as stockholders of the Corporation, except those 
specifically modified by this Agreement. 
17. Subchapter S Election. 
17.1 It is the desire and intention of the 
Corporation and each of the Stockholders that the Corporation 
should make a Subchapter S election under the United States 
-14-
A-22 
Internal Revenue Code 1954, as amended, and should terminate and 
revoke any such election once made only in accordance with the 
determination of the holders of a majority of all the 
outstanding stock of the Corporation, 
17.2 In order to protect any Subchapter S election 
made by the Corporation and to prevent its inadvertent 
termination by transfer of any stock of the Corporation into the 
hands of more than fifteen shareholders or an unqualified or 
nonconsenting shareholder, the Stockholders, intending to 
legally bind themselves, their successors, executors, 
administrators, heirs and assigns, hereby agree as follows; and 
agree that they will vote their shares, execute necessary 
documents, take other required action, and otherwise exert their 
best efforts at all times in good faith to accomplish the 
following objectives: 
(a) If the holders of a majority of all 
outstanding stock of the Corporation at any time determine 
that it will be in the best interest of the Corporation and 
its shareholders to make an election, or to terminate or 
revoke an election, under Subchapter S of the United States 
Internal Revenue Code, (i) the Corporation agrees that it 
will make such election by timely filing of Form 2553 or 
other appropriate form and supporting documents, and to 
terminate or revoke such election and (ii) the Stockholders 
agree that each will give his written consent thereto in 
such form and manner and execute all documents and take 
such other action as may be necessary or adviseable to 
effectuate such determination. If any document evidencing 
such consent or other action is required for filing or 
other purposes under the provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code or otherwise in order to effectuate such 
determination, and any shareholder is unable or otherwise 
fails to execute such document or take such other action in 
due and timely manner, then Stockholder hereby appoints the 
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Secretary of the Corporation to be his attorney-in-fac:fc to 
execute such document and to take all other action in n I S 
place and 6tead which may be necessary or advisable td 
effectuate such determination. 
(b) No Stockholder will sell, assign or tr*ns*er 
any of his shares of the Corporation to any person or l n 
any manner which would cause a Subchapter S election 
theretofore made by the Corporation to be terminated <?r 
revoked, without the prior consent by vote or in writ£n9 °f 
the holders of a majority in interest of all the 
outstanding stock of the Corporation. 
18
- Notices. All notices provided for by this Agreement 
shall be made in writing either by actual delivery of the notice 
into the hands of the party entitled thereto or by mailing the 
notice in the United States mails to the last known address as shown 
on the records of the Corporation, of the party entitled thereto* 
certified mail, return receipt requested. In either case, such 
notice shall be deemed to be given and received upon its actual 
receipt by the party entitled thereto. 
19. Closing Date. The Closing Date shall be August 1/ 
19B1. 
20. Condition Precedent. The obligations of all the 
parties to this Agreement are subject to the Closing of the purchase 
by the Corporation of at least eighty percent of the outstanding 
stock of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
21. Genearl Provisions. 
21.1 Remedies for Breach. The Stock is a unique 
chattel and each party to this Agreement shall have the remedies 
which are available to him, her or it for the violation of any 
of the terms of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, 
the equitable remedy of specific performance. 
21.2 Descriptive Headings. Titles to paragraphs are 
for information purposes only. 
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21.3 Successors, etc. Except as hereinabove 
expressly provided otherwise, this Agreement shall bind and 
inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective 
heirs, distributees, executors, administrators, successors 
(including, without limitations, guardians, conservators, or 
trustees in bankruptcy) and assigns; but nothing herein shall be 
construed as an authorization of any party to assign or delegate 
his rights or obligations hereunder. Each Stockholder by the 
signing hereof directs his or her personal representative to 
open their estates promptly in the courts of proper jurisdiction 
and to execute, procure and deliver all documents, including, 
but not limited to, appropriate orders of court, and estate and 
inheritance tax waivers, as may be required to effectuate the 
purposes of this Agreement. 
21.4 Invalid Provision. The invalidity or 
unenforceability of any particular provision of this Agreement 
shall not affect the other provisions hereof, and the Agreement 
shall be construed in all respects as if such invalid or 
unenforceable provisions were bm-itted. 
21.5 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be 
construed pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah then in 
effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this 
Agreement as of the day and year first above written. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. 
Attest: 
s*»c*ri»hary 
v£SL 
William K. Reagan^// 
•'Roland Webb 
3essie P. Webb 
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